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The key aspects of historical thinking and 
practice which are essential to an under-
standing of how historians come to terms 
with the past consist of, according to Alan 
Munslow, the epistemological model on 
which knowledge of the past depends, the 
role of referentiality in constituting the dis-
course of history, the literary procedures
by which a discourse gives itself the sta-
tus of science, and the deployment of the-
ory and concept in creating meaning about 
the past.1 Jacques Rancière uses the term 
poetics of knowledge to refer to the epis-
temological break of historical discourse.
The poetics of knowledge is the study of the 
rules according to which knowledge is writ-
ten and read, and is constituted as a specific 
genre of discourse.2
Feminist historiography has intervened
critically in the presuppositions that organ-
ise the past and constitute points of con-
flict among historians. These presumptions
comprise of positivism, historical writing 
purporting to be an impersonal observer’s 
objective account of historical actors and 
agents, a conception of time according to 
which the world must be seen as a histori-
cally developing entity, categories of perio-
disation that reflect a linear conception of 
time, and the archive as the foundation to
find truth in the past.3 Both empirical and 
constructivist epistemologies share the be-
lief in the possibility of knowing the past, in 
the referentiality of sources and the sepa-
ration of the historian from his/her object
of inquiry. The ontology of individuality and
the intentionality of actors in historicism is 
substituted in the constructivist approach
by the discovery of structural relations of 
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historical change and their different kinds of determinations (class, national, race, gender, etc.) 
that function as explanatory factors.4
The article attempts to undertake an epistemological inquiry in respect to feminist historiography, 
that is, to interrogate the very operation in which historical knowledge is grasped in feminist histori-
cal writing.5 It focuses on theoretical and methodological approaches of gender history, and more 
extensively of feminist theory, that transformed or point to a radical transformation of historical 
study and writing. As Joan Scott argues, “Feminism’s historical specificity comes from the fact that it 
works within and against whatever are the prevailing foundational assumptions of its time.”6 Gender 
history cannot be approached as a homogeneous field because some of its expressions are perme-
ated by the same assumptions and by the same disputes that preponderate in historiography. It can 
best be viewed as a form of critique, a disruptive, disorienting and, at times, destructive enterprise 
of knowledge.7 The article argues that the rethinking of history’s constitutive premises undertaken 
by gender history consists of the investigation of history as a gendered enterprise and of the ex-
ploration of the gendered subjectivity of the historian, conceptualisations of the archive, challenges 
posed to conventional historiography by historical writing, the interrogation of politicised identity and 
of “women” as a historically variable category. Finally, it considers the history of science, the history 
of the body and the history of sexuality as the fields that have most challenged the knowledge that 
organises our perceptions of “nature” and have called into question positivist history.
The historian’s subjectivity and the concept of the archive
Placing the historian at the centre of their analysis, Bonnie Smith, Joan Scott, Ilaria Porciani and 
Luisa Passerini have shown history to be a kind of patrimony: the term corresponds to the fact 
that for a long time historiography has been appropriated by men. They all agree that gender 
was a constitutive element of academic history, and gender metaphors were important to its 
formation and to the construction of explanatory schemes.8
Gendering the historical narrative opened up illuminating insights into the gender metaphors
and dichotomies that permeate the historical imagination. Regina Schulte explores the crea-
tion of myths in historical narratives by presenting the example of the royal couple. The meta-
morphosis of the royal couple into a middle-class family signals a shift in the representation 
of monarchy in historical discourse. Marie Antoinette appeared as a middle-class mother and 
wife who lived the drama of separation from her children and husband.9 The image of the queen 
before the revolutionary tribunal incorporated the queen into French national history and at the 
same time rehabilitated the institution of the family that had been harmed during the revolution. 
For Luisa Passerini, an area of historical meaning that needs to be recognised and historicised re-
fers to the subjectivity of the historian.10 While history at the time of its formation as an academ-
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ic discipline was to a great extent a family issue, since all the members of the family participated 
in different stages of research and writing, the place of the author was exclusively preserved for 
males.11 The connection between historical rationality and gender led to the establishment of the 
historical profession as a male enterprise. On the one hand, the search for objectivity was perceived 
as appropriate for masculine identity while a new pedagogical role was attributed to the methods 
of historical study (namely, seminar and archival research) in the improvement of men.12 On the 
other hand, the scientific character of history was based on the capacity of men to leave aside their 
gender and class, their political stance as well as their passions and interests. The claim to ob-
jectivity was based on the capacity of the white male to act as universal signifier while the female 
was identified with partiality and particularity. Luisa Passerini and Polymeris Voglis, in their edited 
collection Gender in the Production of History, set as their task to show that the claim to objectivity 
was based on the invisibility of the historian as an author. They argue that “the more hidden in the 
reconstruction of the past the historian was, the more objective and universal his analysis was”.13
The introduction of the concept of subjectivity and the methodological choice that puts the sub-
jectivity of the historian at the centre of the analysis has led to the recognition of the ways in 
which individual subjectivity shapes history and memory and at the same time is shaped by the 
collective aspects of history and memory.14 Passerini has shown that one way of dealing with
the subjectivity of the historian is ego-histoire, a term invented by Pierre Nora in 1987 and reju-
venated recently in a collective endeavour at the European University Institute.15 As Passerini ex-
plains, this approach involves both the treatment of the historian as an object of historical study, 
trying to understand the reasons behind her choices for what concerns method and content and 
the issue of intersubjectivity, which indicates the relationship between generations of historians
but also between historians and the protagonists of their studies.16
The perspectives of feminist epistemology, especially standpoint theory and Donna Haraway’s
doctrine and practice of situated knowledges, go beyond the general premise that the historian’s
values and culture inform the questions posed to the past and that the historian’s imagination or-
ganises the evidence found in the sources.17 They question the assumption that historiography is 
produced by neutral, impassionate and objective methods. These assumptions identify feminist 
questions and women’s history with the specific, the zealous and the partial, and through this
they delegitimise or marginalise feminist historiography.18 Feminist epistemology indicates not 
only that the historian is part of the history s/he produces but also points to the sexist, andro-
centric and racist assumptions that organise historical writing. Haraway challenges the god-trick
of seeing everything from nowhere and insists on the embodied nature of all vision, promoting 
a doctrine of embodied objectivity, which means situated knowledges.19 This vision includes also 
the possibility of seeing faithfully from another’s point of view but also the recognition and theo-
risation of “subjugated” standpoints. Haraway sets situated and embodied knowledges against
various forms of unlocatable, and so irresponsible, knowledge claims.
Feminist historians and standpoint theorists have been critical of viewing the “object” of knowl-
edge as a passive and inert thing. This extends from the conceptualisation of the body and sex 
as “material-semiotic actors”20 to a concept of subjectivity which “is not only dynamic, nonunitary 
and embraces the extra-rational, but is discoverable only within inter-subjective relations”.21 Pas-










serini argues that “[i]nter-subjective relations become the location for the negotiation of mean-
ing. This approach allows [us] to ‘reclaim subjectivity’ for those who were classed as ‘others’
than white middle-class men: black and third world people, working-class people and women.”22
Toni Morrison has written extensively on the monology imposed on subjects who were written 
out of history and the implications of their public representation for the material now available
to tell their stories: “One could write about them, but there was never the danger of their ‘writ-
ing back’. Just as one could speak to them without fear of their ‘talking back’. One could even
observe them, hold them in prolonged gaze, without encountering the risk of being observed,
viewed, or judged in return.”23 Moreover, the “monology” imposed by the exclusion of certain 
memories deprived those excluded of a language with which to narrate their story.
The archive as the male model of the “proper” place where historical research takes place and 
in which the “proper” sources are located constitutes the standard against which all other evi-
dence must be measured. Historical anthropology has explored the archive both as a physical 
structure and a repository of ultimate value and has analysed its role in producing the colonised 
as objects of knowledge.24 The ethnography of the archive and the exploration of its form rather 
than its content show it not as a container of truths but as a signifier of colonial distress and as 
an epistemological process of temporalisation.25
Ann Stoler explores the colonial ontologies of a racial kind that created the foundational fictions 
of colonial rule. By ontology she means the “ascribed being or essence of things, the categories 
of things that are thought to exist or can exist in any specific domain and the specific attributes 
assigned to them”.26 She researches the epistemic practices that were recorded in colonial ar-
chives and which reveal anxieties about what they could have known and how they could have 
known it. She deals with unsured and hesitant sorts of documentation and the sensibilities that 
gathered around them.
Feminist scholarship has interrogated both archive and memory as gendered categories and has 
shown that this gendering has contributed to the marginality of women’s and children’s experi-
ence in and by history. Memory “becomes” her in the sense that is a private realm in which to pre-
serve the past but also in the sense of expressing her relationship to “real” history.27 “Memory has 
been represented as dependent and mendacious (fictional, fickle) and therefore of dubious author-
ity and reliability, all of which are hallmarks of conventional female identity in the context of a het-
erosexual symbolic economy.”28 In her inquiry into what constitutes an archive and of the status 
of memory as evidence, Antoinette Burton demonstrates that “[q]uestioning the verifiability of the 
evidence produced in sites of memory like oral histories, letters, autobiographies and testimonies 
throws doubt on the narratives drawn from them as history”.29 Relegating women’s memories to 
supplements to history is a continuation of the logic of western colonial modernity. The constitu-
tion of an archive of memories requires a public affirmation of their status as an archival source.
Notwithstanding the significant influence of feminist history, the domestic continues to be treat-
ed as beyond history in modernity. This is attributed to the fact that in national discourses the 
domestic is considered as timeless and as the universal “other” of modernity and is simultane-
ously codified as female and private and, consequently, deemed insignificant to be recorded.30
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Burton extends the uses of the word “archive” to include memories of house and home, inter-
rupting in this way the privileging of the archive as some originary site of historical knowledge 
and evidence. Although the status of women as historical subjects is no longer in doubt, as Bur-
ton argues, their capacity to write history is questioned.31 The “objective” task of writing history 
is preserved for men while literature is considered more appropriate for women. Natalie Zemon 
Davis has challenged the dichotomy between history and literature by exploring the forms of nar-
rative that shape the judicial sources of the past.32 As Burton argues, the hierarchical distinction 
between history and literature is part of the process of the archive becoming part of the quest 
for a “truth-apparatus” that underlay social science practices.33
Influenced by Foucault, feminist historiography recognises the archive as a discursive formation 
that reflects the categories of the state itself and its panoptical effect. Archiving memory or the 
domestic and the inclusion of heretofore excluded subjects do not lead to a truer or “historical” 
history, as Burton argues. The illusion of seeing all subjects effectively submits to a redemp-
tive view of history and reproduces the panoptical presumptions of the traditional discipline.34
Challenges to historical narrative
I will use the work of three historians, Carolyn Steedman, Luisa Passerini and Natalie Zemon 
Davis, as exemplary of the way in which their historical writing transformed history fundamen-
tally by experimenting in ways of writing history. All three historians cross disciplinary bounda-
ries and push the boundaries of history beyond what they have been. Their work helps us to see 
how historical consciousness dwells in narrative and its forms. Although I take as examples for 
my exploration of historical writing Steedman’s Landscape for a Good Woman (1986), Passerini’s
Autobiography of a Generation ([1988] 1996) and Davis’ Women on the Margins (1996), my analy-
sis is informed by their other writings as well.
Carolyn Steedman uses the psychoanalytic case study to pose a challenge to the existing histori-
cal genres and to problematise the writing of history as well as to relate historical developments
to subjective experience. Her book challenges the official interpretative devices of social histo-
ry and cultural criticisms which had not reckoned with circumstances of exile and condemned
envy as a political motive. Yet, although psychoanalysis allows longing, envy and desire to enter 
the political stories of class exclusion, its form and imagery perpetuate the marginality of those 
stories that maintain the other’s (middle-class) centrality. Furthermore, psychoanalysis does not 
permit the exploration of social inequality and dispossession in individual subjectivity, something 
that history can do by allowing subjectivity’s entry into political understanding. Steedman’s book 
raises central questions about the development of gender in particular social and class circum-
stances and challenges conventional accounts of working-class childhood and little girlhood.
Luisa Passerini uses a paradoxical “autobiography of a generation”, individual and collective, 
to explore the intersubjectivity of memory, and the ways in which the individual subject, as the
bearer of subjectivity in the psychological, intellectual and cultural sense, is formed by the col-
lective aspects of memory. Using three genres, her own psychoanalysis, the memories of her 










childhood and adulthood as well as her participation in the events of 1968, and the life stories of 
those who were active participants in 1968, Passerini shows how memory creates a history of 
itself. Her analysis of interconnected narratives implements a double motion from remember-
ing to analysing the memories of her subjects, the enterprise of mirroring that is effected by her 
own memories and by the memories of the subjects she has interviewed. It is through this mo-
tion that an innovative history of politics is produced.
Natalie Zemon Davis uses the comparative biography and microhistorical narrative to investigate 
questions of identity in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and to extend agency and self-fash-
ioning to a wider range of situations and social groups, women and peasants. Davis enters into a 
fictitious dialogue between herself and the three women whose lives she seeks to represent. Davis 
sees history as a performative act, and by emphasising the autobiographical writings of the three 
women, she engages in a continuing conversation with them.35 Through the imaginary dialogue 
and the historian’s questioning by her subjects, we are introduced to an epistemological inquiry 
of the historian’s transferential relationship with the subjects of the past, of her desire for com-
munication, connection and exchange, of incomprehensibility and of her power to pull the strings 
of the narrative. “Listen to Mistress Proud and Haughty”, says Marie de l’Incarnation to Natalie Ze-
mon Davis,36 in the same way Steedman, forming an alliance with Samuel Richardson’s heroine 
Pamela, was imaginatively addressed by herself for her defiance: “Who does she think she is?”37
At the same time, we enter into the operation of history, the dual absence that is at the heart of 
historical affect:
There is history because there is a past and a specific passion for the past. And there is 
history because there is an absence of things in words, of the denominated in names. The 
status of history depends on the treatment of this twofold absence of the “thing itself” that 
is no longer there – that is in the past; and that never was – because it never was such as 
it was told. Historical affect is bound to the personal absence of what the names name.38
But the historian insists on being given another chance, and tells the subjects of the past: “Read 
it again.”39
All three historians raise the important issue for the discourse of historical writing of the relation 
between a politics of knowledge and a poetics of narrative, around the question of the represen-
tation of the other. Jacques Rancière argues about a scene crucial for the discourse of histori-
cal study that is born with modern revolution: “that of the living person who speaks too much,
who speaks incorrectly, out of place and outside speech”.40 He brings the example of Percennius’ 
speech which Tacitus declares null and void by exposing the nonplace of his speech. “Not that 
Percennius’ reasons are declared false . . . They have, more fundamentally, no relation to the 
truth. Their illegitimacy is not due to their content but to the simple fact that Percennius is not in 
the position of legitimate speaker. A man of his rank has no business thinking and expressing his 
thought.”41 The issue for Rancière is that historical writing renders the discourse of illegitimate 
speakers null and void of meaning, not through exclusion but through a specific suspension of 
the relations between meaning and truth. It gives them speech in a style that holds together the 
powers of neutrality and those of suspicion.
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In order for the subjects to be understood and recognised as legitimate speaking subjects, the
historian must invent a scene in which spoken words must be audible and individuals may be
recognised. Steedman invented this scene by constructing a historical narrative using the psy-
choanalytic case study as a model. Her aim was to extract the working-class woman’s and
child’s voice from the status that social history had assigned them – as a manifestation of psy-
chological simplicity and as a metaphor for all that has gone wrong in the politics of class. In or-
der to resuscitate their status as subjects, Steedman told the stories of two childhoods, hers and
her mother’s, located in place and politics, organised around questions of gender and class, to
account for forms of class consciousness produced in the child through feelings of envy, long-
ing and desire. This creative activity of invention allows for a redescription and reconfiguration of
a common world of experience. It is in this respect that we may speak of a poetics of politics.42
All three historians use the biographical and autobiographical mode to illuminate experiences
and identities that remained untold and excluded from the narratives of history. At the same
time, their historical accounts are of a different order from the biographical because the sto-
ries they tell are intersubjective – their individual stories are shaped by the experiences of other 
people. They used other people’s stories of the past to tell their own stories while other people
used their stories to reassert their experiences. Thus, a common denominator in all three histo-
rians is the understanding of subjectivity as a collective enterprise in which memory and narra-
tive played an important role in its shaping. Steedman uses her own and her mother’s childhood
in order to tell the secret and marginal stories that other working-class women from a recent
historical past have to tell.43 As Steedman argues, it is difficult for the historian to think outside
the biographical mode, the telling of all stories as if they were a life. The figure of personification
gives a name and a face to the subject that is its reference.44
This marks a shift in the history of emotional and psychological selfhood which was written by
and through the testimony of people in a central relationship to dominant culture. Besides, one of
their major contributions lies in the conceptualisation and historicisation of subjectivity. Their ap-
proach to memory and to the use of the political, religious and cultural background breaks with
the sociological framework which recognises custom and tradition in reshaping individual lives. In
approaching subjectivity as the product of cultural production, they recognise the role of imagina-
tion and imaginary as Passerini puts it, or the “conceptual and psychological baggage that people
carry with them and the disruptions that the irrational and the unconscious make in its running”.45
Passerini introduces the term “shareable” memories in order to show the dynamic dimension of
remembering which can be revealed in the process of the reorganisation of past experiences and
in the emergence of disputing and conflicting memories. This approach allows the historian to
produce alternative versions of the past that would not be possible to extract if she did not take
into account the different and conflicting narratives that subjects share and which shape their 
memory but also the role of silence in the construction of memory. As Passerini argues: “Tak-
ing silence into account means to watch out for the links between forms of power and forms of
silence – repression of various kinds, censorship. It finally means to look more deeply in those
aspects of memory which have to do with oblivion.”46










Davis explores how these women made sense of themselves and with what material they com-
posed the story of an “I”. Religion was certainly the stuff that infused their identity as well as fam-
ily relationships and gender hierarchies. Her biographical account enables the reader to hear 
the voices of these women, to feel how they felt. Yet, it does not deal solely with identity but also 
with difference: It explores the relations of these women, imagined or real, with non-European 
peoples and uses their biographies as the locus where relations of power and claims of supe-
riority emerge. This exploration also allows space for the insertion of non-European eyes that 
return the Europeans’ gaze.
Davis demonstrates that, although these seventeenth-century women’ visions and artefacts
were created from a marginal place, it is the very fact of their marginality that makes them sig-
nificant. She perceives the place of the margin as a “borderland between cultural deposits that 
allowed new growth and surprising hybrids”.47 These women embraced a marginal place in or-
der to free themselves from the constrictions of European hierarchies. “Women on the margins 
can reveal with particular clarity what was at stake for women and men both.48
Microhistory offered, in terms of historical method, a new understanding of the experience of 
the subaltern. While social history was based on a model which organised data in terms of cat-
egories developed to permit maximal aggregation (such as wealth, occupation, etc.), microhis-
tory used “names” as markers for the construction of a new type of social history.49 The focus 
on names of ordinary individuals in the past allows their lives to assume the maximum com-
plexity. This complexity arises out of a thick description in which the lived experience of the in-
dividual is interpreted through her/his location in a variety of social contexts.50 As with the work 
of Steedman, Davis’ microhistorical method aimed at remedying the presentation of subaltern 
subjectivity as homogeneous and fought against those works that preserved individuality and 
subjectivity for the elites, as if the subaltern classes did not deserve a history that pays attention 
to processes of identity formation such as self-fashioning.
Analyzing the workings of memory of the subaltern in sixteenth-century French village life, Davis 
concludes that individual memory was thought as a personal possession and, as the example 
of Bertrand de Rols and Arnaud du Tilh shows, their use of memory unfolds an inner definition
of the self as well as of social invention of identity.51 Self-fashioning is extended to a wider range 
of situations and social groups to include not only the Renaissance elite but also sixteenth-cen-
tury peasants.52
The historical dynamics of naming53
Extending the critique of the subject to the category “women”, Denise Riley designated that 
“women” is a volatile collectivity while being a woman cannot provide an ontological foundation.54
Black and lesbian feminists had pointed to the heterogeneity of women’s experience, shaped
by differences of race, sexual preference, class and age. Referring to the race and class hierar-
chies in the middle-class house, Audre Lorde addressed white American feminists and raised
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the issue of the need to theorise the racism of feminism.55 As Joan Scott argued, the history of
feminism has participated in producing an essentialised common identity of women as it has
been the history of the project of reducing diversities (of class, race, sexuality, ethnicity, politics, 
religion and socioeconomic status) among females to a common identity of women (usually in 
opposition to patriarchy, a system of male domination).56
For Riley, it is the very identity “women” that has to be questioned, as the specifications of differ-
ences still rest on the category “women”. “Women” is a historically and discursively constructed 
category, which became a social category through contested scientific discourses and social
practices.57 There is nothing about “being” female that naturally binds women while the iden-
tity of “women” has been shaped by the different conceptualisations that developed historically.
Riley pointed to the temporality of “women”, that is to the impossibility “to live twenty-four hours a day 
soaked in the immediate awareness of one’s sex”.58 Any identification with the category of “women” 
rests, for Riley, on prior positive or negative deployments of the category, positionings and objectifi-
cations of women. Thus, there are no innocent ways in which one becomes temporarily woman be-
cause it presupposes the adoption of a designation there in advance. An identification that is based on 
the category of experience emphasising either the distinctiveness of women’s bodies or a common 
experience of subordination is problematic because of the epistemological status both of the category 
of “experience” and of “women’s experience”. Women’s experience implies that experiences origi-
nate with women and in this way it masks that these have accrued to women not by virtue of their 
womanhood alone, but as traces of domination, whether natural or political.59 Gender, race and class
identities are the product of the terrible historical experiences of patriarchy, colonialism, racism and 
capitalism. Experience as a base for identity creates a unitary subject without relativising or interro-
gating the means of their production.60 As Scott argues, “it is precisely the imposition of a categorical
subject-status that has marked the operations of difference in the organisation of social life.”61 De-
scribing the differences that separate women can lead to fixed categories, such as working-class, or 
African-American or Islamic women. Writing their history without asking where the identities come 
from, when they arise, and what ends they serve, gives these groups a certain eternal being.62
Donna Haraway discusses the formation of a new model of political identity called “oppositional 
consciousness”, “born of the skills for reading webs of power by those refused stable member-
ship in the social categories of race, sex, or class”. This is a postmodernist identity which breaks
with all the signs of Man in western traditions and rests on contradictory locations and hetero-
chronic calendars and not on relativisms or pluralisms.63 It creates a coalition through affinity, 
not identity. Denying any “privileged” oppressed authorial categories such as “woman”, “black”
and any essential criterion for identifying who is a woman of colour, the definition of “women of 
colour” has been achieved through a conscious appropriation of negation.
The importance of new modes of writing has been stressed by feminist critique and has come
out from the knowledge that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house”.64 The 
writings of “women of colour” explore the themes of identity of those who “never possessed the 
original languages, never told the original story, never resided in the harmony of legitimate het-
erosexuality in the garden of culture”.65










Riley’s notion of the volatility and temporality of the category “women” rests on the Lacanian
notion of identity formation, according to which becoming a subject involves subjection. At the 
same time, she follows Foucault’s argument that any positioning of the subject by disciplinary
discourses produces a contesting politics of the subject. Wendy Brown, although following 
Foucault’s postulation of the subject as an effect of power, discerns an optimism and a kind of 
volunteerism in him when he assumed that insofar power always produces resistance, the dis-
ciplinary subject, capable of resistance, practices freedom. Brown argues that Foucault tacitly
assumed the givenness and resilience of a desire for freedom.66
Brown proposes the privileging of subject formation over social positioning and argues for an
understanding of subjects as not only positioned by power “but as effects of power, as formed 
or produced by power, and ‘as simultaneously undergoing and exercising power’”.67 She under-
stands subjects of racial and gender domination as partial effects of regimes and formations of 
race and sexuality. They construct an oppositional political culture and critique out of their his-
torical exclusion and perform a denaturalising assault on coherent collective identity in the cen-
tre. They refuse the invitation to absorption and “insist instead upon politicising and working into 
cultural critique the very constructions that a liberal humanism increasingly exposed in its tacit 
operations of racial, sexual, and gender privilege was seeking to bring to a formal close”. 68 Yet, 
this assault they perform comes back to trouble their own identities.
Brown emphasises the importance of pain in politicised identity and argues that pain is installed 
at the heart of contemporary demands for political recognition. She argues that politicised iden-
tities become attached to their own exclusion because they are premised on this exclusion for 
their very existence as identity. Simultaneously, the formation of identity “as exclusion augments 
or ‘alters the direction of the suffering’ entailed in subordination or marginalization by finding 
a site of blame for it”. In this way, pain becomes the foundation of its political claim and the ba-
sis for its demand for recognition as identity. Brown argues that identity structured in part by
ressentiment resubjugates itself through its investment in its own pain, through its refusal to 
make itself in the present.
Brown seeks an exit for this resubjugation and the use of memory as the house of this activity
and refusal. She proposes to replace the language of “I am” with the language of “I want” as a 
way to alter modes of political speech so that it destabilises the formulation of identity as a fixed 
position, as entrenchment by history, and as having necessary moral entailments. The replace-
ment that Brown proposes of the language of being with that of wanting entails a shift from 
ontological claims to political ones, claims that forge an alternative future.69 Brown’s demand 
for a subject “in motion, as not-I, as deconstructuble according to the genealogy of want rather 
than as fixed interests or experiences” destabilises presence and reopens the desire for futurity. 
Homi Bhabha too shifts the question of identity from the ontological and epistemological impera-
tive What is identity? to the political prerogative What are identities for? to the pragmatist alterna-
tive What can identities do? He moves away from a cultural and disciplinary identity to a search 
for historical locality. Furthermore, his concern for the historical and geographical location of
identity rather than the persuasions of personhood moves away from the model of multicultural-
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ism and of the politics of recognition, which is founded, as he argues, on a post-Herderian notion 
of authenticity. Authenticity is an essential truth understood as a turn or return to ourselves and 
articulated through a concept of social dialogism. Recognition for Charles Taylor, as Bhabha no-
tices, emanates from a “fusion of horizon” of standards that emerges from an immersion in the 
culture in question and leads to an understanding of what constitutes worth that was not there 
at the beginning. The possibility of the “fusion of horizon” of standards constitutes a new stand-
ard of judgment and is based on the concept of the dialogic subject of culture. Bhabha criticises
the notion of reciprocity on which cultural evaluation and judgment is based. The presumption
of dialogical recognition as reciprocity makes the fusing of horizons a homogenising norm of 
cultural value or worth based on the notion that cultural difference is synchronous. Besides, the 
process of the transvaluation of cultural judgment presupposes the ahistorical and immanent
presence of the dialogical subject of authenticity. More problematic is the totalising effect that the 
notion of dialogic recognition has on cultural difference. As Bhabha argues, “reciprocity assumes
that dialogic recognition exists within a binary relationship that consists of two unitary (individ-
ual or collective) cultural subjects; difference is constituted and totalised within each culture.”70
Bhabha adopts the problematic of proximity for the production of the minority subject rather than
the question of reciprocity. He replaces the “relation of the two” with the internally ambivalent
subject structured through the temporal disjunction of present being. Dialogism demands tem-
poral coevality for successful recognition, but the minority subject emerges from a history of dis-
criminatory and exclusionary practices. The minority subject is produced through the proximity 
of difference.71 In Taylor’s conceptualisation of migrant or diasporic peoples, Bhabha reads the
model of a national peoples, as representatives of their national or atavistic cultural heritages, 
or as part of a mosaic within the homogeneous empty time of the nation. Bhabha formulates 
difference as a proximate activity in the sense of the ambivalence in identification with others, 
objects, ideas, ourselves. The difference of proximity refuses to posit the relations of persons or 
cultures as different on the normalising grounds of an abstract universality of meaning or on a 
shared, synchoronised temporality of present being. Proximity is the excess of the hybrid state, 
where the problem for the American black and white person is neither incorporation nor assimi-
lation but the recognition of the double relation and its “interfection”. The poetics of proximity,
that is writing in the middle of difference, is a political movement.
Jacques Rancière’s elaboration of political subjectivisation connects his historiographical prac-
tice with politics calling for a transformation of the poetic structures of knowledge. For Ran-
cière, the identification of politics with the self of a community is what constitutes the dead end 
of political reflection. It can be articulated through the claim of identity for the so-called minori-
ties against the hegemonic role of the ruling culture and identity. Or it can be expressed through 
the identification of governing with the principle of the community under the axiom of universal-
ity, the law or liberal democracy. Although they are not equivalent practices, they stem from the 
same questionable identification. Policy acts as the self of the community and turns the tech-
niques of governing into natural laws of the social order. Rancière distinguishes policy from poli-
tics and through this distinction he formulates the politics of emancipation as the politics of the 
self as an other. The logic of emancipation is a heterology.72 The process of emancipation is en-
acted in the name of a category denied either the principle or the consequences of that equality: 










workers, women, people of colour or others. It is not enacted in the name of a social category 
with which the subject that invokes its rights could identify with. Because it is the name of an 
outcast. Outcast is the name of those who are denied an identity in a given order of policy. Thus, 
the process of subjectivisation is a process of disidentification or declassification. It is the name 
given to people who are in-between: between humanity and inhumanity, citizenship and its de-
nial, between the status of a man of tools and the status of a speaking and thinking being. The 
place for the working out of difference is an interval or a gap: being together to the extent that 
we are in-between, between names, cultures, identities. “Policy is about ‘right’ names, names 
that pin people down to their place and work. Politics is about ‘wrong’ names – misnomers that 
articulate a gap and connect with a wrong.”73 Political subjectivisation is not about the settlement 
of a wrong, consensus or innocent communication but the handling of a wrong by people who 
are together to the extent that they are in-between.74
Rancière departs from the communicative rationality mode that presupposes the existence of 
a priori pragmatic constraints that compel interlocutors to communicate and, thus, rests on the 
premise that both speaker and the objects about which they speak are preconstituted. The his-
toriographical practice Rancière introduces is concerned with the liberation of the discourse of 
subaltern subjects from the dictates of historicism, which is a discourse of propriety, of keep-
ing things “in their place”.75 Rancière deals with the “excess of words”, with the power of subjects 
to circulate words, “useless” and unnecessary words that exceed the function of rigid designa-
tion. Workers were able to use and reappropriate abandoned terms such as tyrant, proletarian, 
and in this way they designated a category of political subjectivity. They reconfigured the rela-
tion between the visible and the sayable, the relation between those who are entitled to speak
and those who are not. This act signifies a “partition of the sensible”, that is, of what it was pos-
sible to say. For Rancière, “politics is an activity of reconfiguration of that which is given in the 
sensible.”76 At the same time, the historian needs a poetics of knowledge in order to account 
for subaltern subjects as legitimate speaking subjects. This means redeeming the workers’
speech from the status cultural and social history assigned to them and treat them as inven-
tions of forms of language similar to all others. A new poetics of knowledge is indifferent to the 
status of the speaker but also presents a challenge to the divisions between the disciplines and 
the discourses of knowledge.77
Rancière departs from a conception of history that explains things only in terms of their specific 
time and place, which involves a notion of contemporaneity established particularly by the history
of mentalities. He opposes this notion, according to which one can only think what a specific time 
and place allows us to think. “To explicate a phenomenon by referring it to its time,” Rancière ar-
gues, “means to put into play a metaphysical principle of authority camouflaged as a methodo-
logical precept of historical inquiry”.78 His notion of contemporaneity presupposes the restaging 
of certain entirely anachronistic, symbolic oppositions in workers’ utterances, like those found in 
the etymology of proletarius. The historian has to designate those instances when one author-
ises oneself to think what that particular time considered illegitimate to think.
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History of science, history of the body and history of sexuality
Fields that had been considered marginal in the historical discipline, such as the history of sci-
ence, the history of the body and the history of sexuality, challenged the positivist model; intro-
duced to historiography new theoretical and methodological tools and new kinds of sources
such as anatomical maps, medical records, wax models; exercised an epistemological critique
to traditional sources and broke disciplinary boundaries. Furthermore, they incited historians to
rethink the nature of categories like selfhood, identity and modernity.
Among of the aims of researchers in these fields were to explore the extent to and the ways in which
gender informs historical practice and the extent to which notions of femininity and masculinity in-
form the production of scientific knowledge, what we see and how we see it. The analysis of the
metaphors that science used revealed that they were defined by the dichotomies of male–female,
nature–culture, active–passive, public–private, which all referred immediately to sexual difference.79
The eighteenth-century wax models of the female body and the images of anatomy showed the con-
struction of the female body as a passive object of historical research discovered by the scientist.80
These fields of history do not focus on events, mentalities or problems but to the processes
through which science constituted itself as a regime of truth. The shift in epistemological para-
digms is one of the ways to understand ruptures, changes and discontinuities. Thomas Laqueur 
argues that the one-sex model dominated thinking about sexual difference from late antiquity
to the seventeenth century.81 While prior to 1700, male and female bodies were seen as homol-
ogous, in the eighteenth century they started to be perceived by anatomists as fundamentally
distinct. The two-sex model, as Laqueur argues, was not the outcome of scientific advances but
of political considerations that required new justifications for gender inequality and masculine
dominance. The new model was not the result of scientific observation but was created in po-
litical discourse within the framework of the contest for power and middle-class domination.82
Most historians consider the eighteenth century as a key stage in the development of catego-
ries of male and female as incommensurable biological sexes. Laqueur’s work has been criti-
cised for assuming the universality of a one-sex model in the early modern period and for ig-
noring other sources that revealed nonprofessional understandings of conception and sexual
difference, such as pornography, cheap medical treatises and court depositions.83 Karen Harvey
attempted to reconstruct other ways the body was understood by reading eighteenth-century
erotica as a guide to conceptions of the sexed body.84 Furthermore, historians do not assume a
smooth transition from the one-sex to the two-sex model and have observed the coexistence of
the two models both during Reformation and at the end of the nineteenth century, taking Freud
as an example. Randolf Trumbach argues for a shift from the existence of three kinds of bodies
and two genders prior to 1700 to the existence of two kinds of bodies and three genders after 
1700.85 In recent work, Laqueur’s thesis of a move from a one-sex to a two-sex model of bodies
is integrated into a much broader picture incorporating both sexual desire and gender roles.86
Gianna Pomata has called into question the primacy of the male body as the Gestalt, the para-
digm that guided the perception of the female body in medical discourse from antiquity to the










late eighteenth century. Taking as an example haemorrhoidal bleeding, which was perceived
as menstrual flow, she argues that in early modern European medicine it was the female body 
that was exemplary from a therapeutic point of view while the male body emulated the men-
struating female body.87
Historians of the body and sexuality have seen it as their task to take a second look at apparent 
truths and as a central aim of their exploration into how modern certainties came into being.88
Carolyn Walker Bynum showed that the body has a history and that the female body in particular 
started to behave differently between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries in Europe.89 Placing 
the female body at the centre of her analysis, Bynum argued that the somatisation of religious
experience observed in the thirteenth century constitutes a particularly female expression of re-
ligious experience and signifies a new conception of the individual as a psychosomatic unity. The 
association of women with the body or the humanity of Christ in theological doctrines led to an 
identification of Christ’s flesh with the female, at least in its therapeutic functions and nurturing. 
If we look at the traditions (physiological theory, theology, medicine) that associated women with
matter, flesh and food, we will not find the medieval dichotomies of psyche and body. Medieval
theologians and natural philosophers, Bynum argues, “often mixed and fused the genders, treat-
ing not just the body of Christ but all bodies as male and female”.90 The religious iconography 
that represented Christ’s body both as female and as male shows the permeability of genders 
in medieval thinking. Thus, the conception of the body was much more complex than the dicho-
tomic view that identified the female body with sin and the male with spirituality.
The meeting of gender history with social anthropology destabilised the primacy of the event
in the study of the past as well as conventional modes of periodisation by placing emphasis on 
ruptures rather than continuities.91 The study of sexual violence and crimes of honour through 
the analysis of symbolic representations and cultural scripts that circumscribe the arena within 
which past experiences make sense highlighted the historicity of concepts like honour and sex-
uality, their cultural meanings and their role in defining gender and class relations.92 The exami-
nation of persecutions for superstitious and magical practices in the Venetian Inquisition in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries shows that gender identity and conceptions of honour con-
stituted fields of negotiation within the framework of the disciplining of the population.93 The un-
derstanding of the past as “other”, the exploration of alien perspectives of the past and the call on 
the historian to see the past through the native’s interpretation of the ways in which natives feel 
and think are invitations to shake off feelings of familiarity with the past and to deal with doses 
of cultural shock. Yet, the acceptance of a radical alterity of the past belies a homogeneous un-
derstanding of the past and reveals the difficulty of the historian to discern the “projection” onto 
the other and her transferential relation to the past.94
The use of psychoanalytic concepts in the study of conflicts that arose around issues of sexu-
ality and gender, religion and witchcraft has offered innovative analyses of the ways subjects
experienced various forms of violence in the past. Miranda Chaytor studied rape accusations in 
seventeenth-century England and used a psychoanalytically informed approach on memory. 
Understanding memory as a process of exclusion as well as inclusion, Chaytor looks for the 
thoughts that the narratives of rape refused to accommodate, which were resisted within them 
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and displaced. This reading of the unconscious in the narratives is a psychoanalysis that can be
put to historical use because it looks outwards to the culture from which the thoughts in ques-
tion have come.95 In the husband(ry) framework, narratives tried to keep the sexual at bay. Hon-
our in rape accusations lay not in the victim herself but above and beyond her – in belonging,
in her husband(ry). What the women and children refused to remember was the rape itself, the
sexuality of it, the body penetrated, dirtied, bleeding, in pain. What they put in sexuality’s place
was a property crime.
Barbara Duden moved from the “history of the body” to the “history beneath the skin”, that is to
the histories of perceptions that penetrate the skin. She proceeded from an understanding of
the body “as an epoch-specific experience” to a “historical somatology”, that is, to the research
on the somatic referent of the grammatical “first person singular”: the flesh and blood, the sub-
stance of the speaking “I”. Studying how women in the eighteenth century experienced their bod-
ies, Duden observed that they did not talk about their body but about themselves. Their narra-
tives were a “bio-logy”, that is logos (discourse) about vios (life), and by this she understood that
the first person has a history. She understands the body as the ultimate stuff, as something that
cannot be abstracted (the concretissimum), and in consequence as something that can only be
understood by mimesis, in the ancient meaning of the word. By mimesis Duden means her at-
tempt as a historian to estrange from herself, of the way she feels her body which is the result
and condition of her historical somatology. Duden is not interested in creating a “body” of his-
torical evidence of body history but in learning how to embody the pastness of “biology” in her 
own present, which demanded the cultivation of haptic mimesis, the refinement of her senso-
rium, and the survival of her synaisthisis (common sense). In other words, to create a historical
method based on “a gut feelings for the past”.96
In order to trace the historicity of somatic autoception – the different ways people sensed their 
bodies in different historical periods – she focuses on pregnancy as a privileged instance in which
to grasp the contrast between becoming pregnant and diagnosed pregnancy. As a historian of
the unborn, Duden argues that “life” was a nonexistent technical concept except at the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century and it is nowadays used only in conversation and not in science.
She perceives the recent coinage of “life” as an indication of a huge epistemological break. Du-
den asks for a questioning of the certainties that led women in a corner “where pregnancy is de-
fined in terms of the modern fetus and then in terms of something called life, for which we are
all asked to take public responsibility”.97
Duden explores “the conditions under which, in the course of one generation, technology along 
with a new discourse has transformed pregnancy into a process to be managed, the expected 
child into a fetus, the mother into an ecosystem, the unborn into a life, and life into a supreme val-
ue”.98 The main objective of her study is to show that the human foetus is an engineered construct 
of modern society whose invention and acceptance led not only to the disembodiment of women 
but also to her subjection to the professional management of her “scientifically” defined needs.
Duden examines how the woman was constructed as a scientific fact, the foundations of which 
were laid in the eighteenth century. How did this fact become so popular and how was it inter-










nalised by women like herself and also projected onto women in the past? What circumstances
made the skinning of women acceptable and inspired public concern for what happens in her in-
nards? What made possible the massive mobilisation of women in becoming accomplices in the
opening of their flesh, and in witnessing the creation of this symbol of loneliness, of the foetus?
She was led to these questions when she understood that the women patients in the eighteenth
century experienced their bodies differently than her.99 The disembodiment of the I, which intro-
duces the body into the canon of historical subjects, is an obstacle for the modern historian in
understanding the somatic-autoception of women in the past and the somatic mimesis through
which the eighteenth-century doctor embodied the tragedy of the human condition.
The history of the body and the history of sexuality have become established fields of inquiry
that explore the interrelationship between forms of selfhood and modernity.100 Furthermore, the
emergence of the historicity of sexuality and sexual practices as a central preoccupation of femi-
nist history and queer studies has caused trouble in historiography in respect to notions of famil-
iarity, periodisation and of the past as a source of identity. Into the centre of the historiographical
debate came the question of the modern notion of sexual identity and whether there was such
an identity before the nineteenth century.101 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick offered an escape from this
impasse by arguing that it is not right to assume a smooth transition of identities in chrono-
logical sequence. The inquiry of how modern the modern homosexual is aimed at redeeming
queer material from the condensation of medieval historiography but also to show similarities
between the medieval and postmodern homosexual.102 The ultimate aim was to challenge con-
ventional notions of periodisation of western epistemology and to bring forth the heterosexual
projection of historians to the past.
Feminist historians have emphasised the management of sexuality as a central factor of colonial
ideology and practice in determining political and administrative procedures of colonial govern-
ment. Philippa Levine has indicated the establishment of a census-style knowledge in British
colonies in the nineteenth century whereby a sex census was fashioned by counting, enumerat-
ing and categorising women who worked in prostitution.103 Paul Kramer showed the politicisa-
tion of prostitution during the Philippine–American War and the emergence of systems of regu-
lation that issued gendered and racialised notions of morality and disease.104 Historians of sex-
uality and researchers of queer studies promote alternative practices of reading the past, em-
phasising the presence of the past in the present and proposing a “phasmatic historiography”,105
a systematic investigation of what is hidden and unseeable, of what is below or behind the phe-
nomena that manifest the existence of a past.106 They challenge conventional concepts of pe-
riodisation and provoke a rethinking of the gender prejudices of epistemological foundations.107
The concept of gender brings into critical examination the foundational principles of historiog-
raphy, the premises of its existence. As Sarah Mahler points out, we have to look for gender 
not only in the right places, in which we expect to find women, or in the places where women
ceremonially inhabit but also in the wrong places, where women are absent.108 As gender or-
ganises relations of power in different fields, Mahler calls for an examination of gendered ge-
ographies of power such as international frameworks, world-systems and migration. Similarly,
Eleni Varikas perceives gender history as history against the grain. We should not seek, she ar-
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gues, the subjects in their place, where a preconstituted and normative perception of “society” 
puts them: the worker in the factory, the domesticated woman in the house, black people in the 
plantation, minorities in the ghetto. Following Theodor Adorno’s argument that objectification is 
a kind of oblivion, Varikas suggests that we have to rethink and unearth what is hidden beneath 
the taken-for-granted of a procedure, of a theory, of a concept – in the sense of what has been 
repressed or suppressed. “The research of the historicity of gender is rooted in the remember-
ing of all that has been neglected, forgotten or thought as resolved within the framework of the 
logic of finished events.”109
Feminist critique proposes the shift from the discussion of identity from the perspective of per-
sonality – be it individual, collective, subordinate or dominant – to its handling as an issue of his-
torical and geographical location. This location is perceived as part of the production of the sub-
ject, as a component of its shaping. The turn towards world history and the insertion of gender 
into it open new ways of understanding how gender and race produce hierarchies and sustain 
colonial domination; they also remove historiography from Eurocentric dichotomic approaches
and reifications of the nation by focusing on interrelation, communication, contact and exchange.
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